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ABSTRACT 
We consider the static traffic assignment model in which 
travelers are boundedly rational in their route choice. This 
assignment introduces uncertainty, since generally multiple 
Boundedly Rational User Equilibrium (BRUE) solutions 
exist. In this paper, we propose a day-to-day toll strategy that 
steers the network from an observed BRUE to a desired 
BRUE. We prove that the stationary state of this toll strategy 
is the desired flow, and we show by example that the 
strategy can achieve any flow.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Strategic decision making for traffic authorities is often 
based on static traffic assignment models. When measures 
are implemented, intended to change the distribution, 
authorities often seek for measures that improve the 
observed traffic distribution towards an assignment with less 
traffic congestion, a fairer assignment, or an assignment 
with less total travel time or pollution [1]. In this paper, we 
propose a strategy that can be used as a model by authorities 
to improve traffic situations. 
 
When researching traffic networks, often the notion of the 
User Equilibrium (UE) is used to describe the stationary 
state of traffic networks, and it is assumed that the UE is 
observed in real life. The UE is a traffic assignment in which 
no traveler can improve his or her travel time by unilaterally 
changing routes [2]. This notion of UE to model networks, 
is based on naive decision-making assumptions. It is 
assumed that travelers are perfectly rational in their route 
choice: they make selfish decisions, are perfectly informed, 
and can perfectly assess the effects of the decisions they 
make [3]. 
 
Bounded Rationality was introduced in the context of traffic 
problems by Mahmassani and Chang in the form of the 
Boundedly Rational User Equilibrium (BRUE) [4]. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the BRUE is more 
appropriate to describe the real-world equilibrium than the 
UE. The BRUE is the result of a traffic assignment when we 
consider travelers to be boundedly rational. The BRUE does 
not assume perfect rationality as the User Equilibrium does, 
because travelers do not always choose the shortest path [5]. 
Instead of wanting the best possible route, travelers are now 
assumed to be content with their (suboptimal) travel times 
when they are ‘acceptable’. In contrast to the UE, where 
under basic assumptions only one solution can be found, 
there is a range of solutions for the BRUE [4]. Note that, 
even though multiple ‘stable’ solutions exist, only one 
solution is observed in real life. This difference makes the 
UE a lot more convenient to work with, mathematically.  
 
The fact that there are multiple solutions to the BRUE leads 
to difficulties for an authority, since it is unknown which 
BRUE arises in practice after a policy intervention [8]. 
However, the fact that there are multiple solutions to the 
BRUE can also be seen as an advantage, which we use in 
our strategy.  
 
In this paper, we design a method that steers the network 
from a given assignment to a desired, better BRUE. From 
an equity perspective, it would be best to move to the UE 
(the UE is a special case of the BRUE). From a system 
perspective, we would like to move to a solution that lowers 
the total costs. In this paper, we work towards a desired 
BRUE assignment that minimizes travel costs, assuming we 
can find this assignment efficiently. Note that the desired 
can be any assignment, and therefore other objectives can 
be pursued as well, for example minimizing pollution. 
 
In fact, the strategy we propose is a day-to-day toll strategy. 
Every day a different toll is collected. Where traditional 
approaches typically collect tolls on a link level (see, e.g., 
Guo), advances in mobile applications allow for a more 
personalized toll system like proposed here [6]. As 
mentioned, we aim for a BRUE solution as the desired 
assignment, since it allows us to remove the toll, and the 
assignment will stay. This is due to the fact that every BRUE 
is a stable solution, because travelers are satisfied with their 
(suboptimal) routes in a BRUE. Therefore, tolls only have 
to be collected for a limited amount of time, which, we 
hypothesize, is preferable over collecting tolls continuously 
 
PROBLEM FORMULATION  
Traffic Assignment 
The traffic assignment is done given a fixed demand. 𝐺 =
(𝑉, 𝐸) is the directed traffic network, with 𝑉 the set of nodes 
and 𝐸 the set of links 𝑒 = (𝑖, 𝑗) with 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑉. Given is a set 
of origin-destination pairs (OD-pairs), 𝐾 ⊆ 𝑉×𝑉, for which 
the static demand 𝑑𝑘 > 0, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. One OD-pair is referred to 
as OD-pair 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. An OD-pair 𝑘 is connected by the set 𝑃𝑘 
of simple directed paths (routes). The set of all paths is the 
union of the paths that connect each OD-pair, 𝑃 =∪𝑘∈𝐾 𝑃𝑘 . 
A feasible traffic flow for fixed demand 𝑑 ∈ ℝ|𝐾| is (𝑓, 𝑥) 
such that 
 (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ ≔
{(𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℝ|𝑃|×ℝ|𝐸||Λ𝑓 = 𝑑, Δ𝑓 = 𝑥, 𝑓 ≥ 0}. 
Then, 𝑓 is the vector which describes the flow on each route, 
while 𝑥 is the vector that describes how the flows, described 
by 𝑓, are distributed over the links. 
The OD-path incidence matrix Λ ∈ ℝ|𝐾|×|𝑃| is defined such 
that Λ𝑘𝑝 = 1 if 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘, so if path 𝑝 connects OD-pair 𝑘, and 
Λ𝑘𝑝 = 0 otherwise. The link-path incidence matrix is 
denoted by and defined as Δ ∈ ℝ|𝐸|×|𝑃| where Δ𝑒𝑝 = 1 if 
edge 𝑒 is on path 𝑝, and Δ𝑒𝑝 = 0 otherwise.  
 
For every link 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 a flow-dependent travel time (latency, 
cost) 𝑙𝑒(𝑥) is defined. We assume that link costs are 
separable, continuous, convex and strictly monotonically 
increasing. Separable link costs ensure that the travel time 
of a link does not depend on the traffic located on other 
links, i.e., 𝑙𝑒(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑒(𝑥𝑒). The cost of a path is defined as 
the sum of all links on that path, 𝑐𝑝(𝑓) = ∑ 𝑙𝑒(𝑥𝑒)𝑒∈𝑝 ∀𝑝 ∈
𝑃. The cost of a path depends on the link flows indirectly, as 
the route flows 𝑓 will determine the link flows 𝑥.  
 
Boundedly Rational User Equilibrium 
The BRUE is a traffic distribution in which travelers do not 
necessarily take the shortest path, but a path of which the 
costs are ‘acceptable’. We introduce an indifference band, 
which is the maximum difference in travel cost between the 
shortest path and the chosen path that is still perceived 
acceptable. Formally, given an indifference band 𝜀 ∈ ℝ+
|𝐾|
, 
traffic flow (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ with cost vector 𝑐(𝑓) is called a 
Boundedly Rational User Equilibrium (BRUE), if ∀𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 
and ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 the following condition is satisfied: 
𝑓𝑝 > 0 ⇒ 𝑐𝑝(𝑓) ≤ min
𝑞∈𝑃𝑘
𝑐𝑞(𝑓) + 𝜀𝑘.         (1) 
 
A BRUE flow is a feasible flow (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ that satisfies (1), 
a flow in which every path that carries flow has a cost within 
the specified range. We assume that 𝜀 is constant over time. 
The condition described in (1) was first discussed by 
Mahmassani and Chang, after which it was formalized by, 
among others, Di et al., and Lou et al. [4] [7] [8].  
 
We define a penalty function as introduced by Ye and Yang 
[9]: 
𝛾𝑝(𝑓) ≔ max{?̃?𝑝(𝑥, 𝜏) − 𝜀𝑘 , ?̃?𝑘} , 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾,         (2) 
This penalty function is equal to the costs of the shortest path 
when a path satisfies the BRUE condition, otherwise it is 
equal to the amount by which the path is ‘too expensive’. In 
(2), ?̃?𝑝(𝑥, 𝜏) ≔ 𝑐𝑝(𝑥) + 𝜏𝑝 , 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, is the 
experienced travel costs, that consists of the travel time and 
the induced toll 𝜏 ∈ ℝ|𝑃|, and ?̃?𝑘 ≔ min
𝑞∈𝑃𝑘
?̃?𝑞 (𝑥), 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, is 
the shortest path including toll.  
 
We define the total penalty as 𝑓𝑇𝛾(𝑓), we multiply the 
penalty with the flow that encounters that penalty. When 
𝑓𝑇𝛾(𝑓) = 𝑓𝑇(ΛT?̃?𝑘), then 𝑓 is a BRUE assignment as in 
(1), because then each penalty is equal to the cost of the 
shortest path, and therefore each path satisfies the BRUE 
condition. Indeed, it directly follows that 𝑓𝑝 > 0 ⇒ 𝑐𝑝(𝑥) −
𝜀𝑘 ≤ 𝜇𝑘, which equals condition (1). 
 
Discrete Adjustment Process 
For defining the strategy, we consider a Discrete Adjustment 
Process (DAP) to describe travelers' behavior with respect 
to route choice from day-to-day. We follow the formulation 
of Guo et al. [6]. The process describes how a new 
assignment at time epoch 𝑛 + 1, 𝑓(𝑛 + 1), is achieved by 
adding part of the current assignment at 𝑛, 𝑓(𝑛), to part of a 
new assignment, 𝑔(𝑛).  
The DAP of route flows is formally formulated as: 
𝑓(𝑛 + 1) = (1 − 𝜆(𝑛))𝑓(𝑛) + 𝜆(𝑛)𝑔(𝑛), 𝑛 = 1,2, …   (3) 
 
The flow 𝑓(𝑛 + 1) on day 𝑛 + 1 then consists of two parts, 
i.e., 𝑓(𝑛), the travelers that did not change their route, and 
𝑔(𝑛), the travelers that did change their route. The 
adjustment ratio 𝜆(𝑛) shows that only part of the travelers 
reconsiders their choice each day, the other part stays on 
their route. The adjustment ratio is 𝜆(𝑛) ∈ (0,1] and 𝑔(𝑛) 
satisfies a condition which is described in (8). 
 
Travelers reconsider their choice when they are on a path 
that they consider as ‘too expensive’. This means that that 
path has unacceptable travel cost, i.e., 𝑐𝑝(𝑥) >
min
𝑞∈𝑃𝑘
𝑐𝑞(𝑓) + 𝜀𝑘. They will then switch to a path that they 
perceive (based on the costs of day 𝑛) as less costly. 
Additionally, 𝜆(𝑛) has a mathematical purpose, it 
determines whether the process described in (3) converges 
to a stationary solution. A stationary solution is a solution 
where the assignment at time epoch 𝑛 is the same 
assignment as at time epoch 𝑛 + 1, i.e. 𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑛 + 1). In 
other words, a stationary solution is an assignment in which 
no traveler wants to change routes. 
 
DESIRED ASSIGNMENT TOLL STRATEGY 
In this section, we propose a day-to-day toll strategy that 
steers the network from an observed BRUE to a desired 
assignment. The strategy presumes that a desired 
assignment has been defined and calculated, for example the 
BRUE with minimal travel times, or minimal pollution.  
 
Notations 
We introduce a reformulation so that we can describe all 
BRUE solutions. This is formulation is equivalent to the 
formulation used by Eikenbroek et al. and Di et al. [10] [7]. 
Parameter ?̃? ∈ ℝ|𝑃|, 0 ≤ ?̃?𝑝 ≤ 𝜀𝑘, 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, is defined 
as follows for 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾: 
?̃?𝑝 ≔  {
𝜇𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘 − 𝑐𝑝(𝑓)             if 𝑐𝑝(𝑓) ≤ 𝜇𝑘 + 𝜀𝑘
0                           otherwise.
           (4) 
 
We define a minimization problem corresponding to our 
notation: 
 min ?̃? (?̃?, 𝑓, 𝑥) = ∑ ∫ 𝑙𝑒(𝜔)𝑑𝜔 + ?̃?
𝑇𝑓
𝑥𝑒
0𝑒∈𝐸
  
s.t. (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ.            (5) 
 
Note that this notation corresponds to the Beckmann 
formulation when ?̃? = 0 [11], which is the formulation used 
to find the regular UE. 
 
The formulation in (5) finds a BRUE assignment for given 
?̃?. For each fixed  ?̃?, optimization problem (5) has a unique 
solution with respect to the link flows. That means that 
each  ?̃? determines a BRUE assignment. Further, Di et al. 
proved that any BRUE assignment can be described by a 
unique  ?̃? [7].  
 
We consider the system of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
optimality conditions that correspond to optimization 
problem (5) [12]. These conditions are both necessary and 
sufficient conditions for optimality, as ?̃? is convex in (𝑓, 𝑥) 
for given 𝜌.̃ We introduce Lagrange multiplier vector 
(𝛽, 𝜋, 𝛿) ∈ ℝ|𝐸|×ℝ|𝐾|×ℝ|𝑃|. 
 
 
Proposition 1. Any (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ is a global optimal solution 
of optimization problem (5), if and only if (𝑓, 𝑥) satisfies the 
following system with (𝛽, 𝜋, 𝛿) ∈ ℝ|𝐸|×ℝ|𝐾|×ℝ|𝑃| with 
𝛿 ≥ 0: 
𝑙(𝑥) − 𝛽 = 0, 𝛿𝑇?̃? = 0,  
?̃? + 𝛽𝑇Δ + Λ𝑇𝜋 − 𝛿 = 0,   (𝑓, 𝑥) ∈ ℱ. 
We substitute 𝛽𝑒 = 𝑙𝑒(𝑥𝑒) for all 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 and from the 
complementarity condition 𝛿𝑇?̃? = 0 we find: 
𝑓𝑝 > 0 ⇒ 𝑐𝑝(𝑓) + ?̃?𝑝 + 𝜋𝑘 = 0, ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾.         (6) 
 
Proposition 1 describes a condition that must be fulfilled for 
a solution to be optimal, thus for a solution to be a BRUE 
solution described by  ?̃?. We use Proposition 1 later in 
Theorem 1 to prove that the stationary solution of the toll 
strategy is the desired assignment. 
 
Toll Strategy 
In the previous paragraph, we showed that we can describe 
any assignment by a  ?̃?. Now say that (𝑓𝑑 , 𝑥𝑑) ∈ ℱ, 
(𝑓𝑑, 𝑥𝑑) satisfies condition (1), is the desired assignment, 
described by ?̃?𝑑, the assignment that we want to achieve by 
applying the toll strategy. The toll on route 𝑝 for day 𝑛 + 1 
is defined as: 
𝜏𝑝(𝑛 + 1) ≔
{
?̃?𝑑
𝑝
      if 𝑐𝑝(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑝
= min {𝑐𝑝(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑞
} ,
𝜀𝑘 + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑝
          otherwise.
    (7) 
 
Intuitively, the toll ensures that every path that is ‘too 
expensive’, the path does not satisfy the BRUE condition in 
(1) for the new assignment, gets a high toll. The toll makes 
the path even more expensive and therefore serves as 
incentive for changing routes. Then each user bases their 
route choice on day 𝑛 + 1 on the travel time of day 𝑛 and 
the toll on day 𝑛 + 1, which induces the penalty: 
𝛾𝑝(𝑓) = max {𝑐𝑝(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑝
, 𝑐𝑞(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑞
} , 𝑝 ∈
𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, in which 𝑞 is the shortest path described by ?̃?𝑘. 
The penalty for a path 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 becomes: ?̃?𝑝(𝑛) = 𝑐𝑝(𝑓(𝑛)) +
?̃?𝑑
𝑝
. Then, every traveler experiences a penalty equal to 
their travel cost plus the  ?̃?𝑑 value of their current path. 
 
We use (3) to update the flows. The adjustment ratio is again 
𝜆(𝑛) ∈ (0,1] and 𝑔(𝑛) satisfies: 
𝑔(𝑛) {
∈ Φ(n),    if Φ(n) ≠ ∅,
= 𝑓(𝑛),    if Φ(n) = ∅.
          (8) 
The set Φ(𝑛) is defined as: 
 Φ(𝑛) = {𝑔 ∈ ℱ𝑓|𝑔
𝑇(𝑐(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?𝑑) < 𝑓(𝑛)𝑇(𝑐(𝑓(𝑛)) +
?̃?𝑑)}. 
 
The set Φ(𝑛) thus contains all assignments in which 
travelers changed to paths with lower penalty values, and 
one of these assignments is chosen to update the flows. 
 
Theorem 1 can be explained intuitively as follows. In a 
stationary flow pattern, no user wants to change their route, 
they are satisfied with their travel time including toll. 
Theorem 1 shows that this stationary assignment is then the 
desired assignment described by  ?̃?𝑑. 
 
Theorem 1. If 𝑓(𝑛) is a stationary flow pattern of the system 
defined in (3) with the toll strategy defined in (7), i.e. 
𝑓(𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑛 + 1), then 𝑓(𝑛) is a flow that solves 
optimization problem (5) with parameter   ?̃?𝑑 . 
Proof. Suppose that the flow is stationary, then 𝑓(𝑛) =
𝑓(𝑛 + 1), thus 𝑔(𝑛) = 𝑓(𝑛), i.e. the set Φ(𝑛) must be 
empty, so it is true that: 
(𝑔 − 𝑓(𝑛))
𝑇
(𝑐(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?𝑑) ≥ 0, ∀𝑔 ∈ ℱ𝑓 . 
Then, 𝑓(𝑛) gives a solution to the following Linear 
Program: 
min
𝑦
𝑦𝑇 (𝑐(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?𝑑
𝑝
) s.t. Λ𝑦 = 𝑑, 𝑦 ≥ 0.     (9) 
 
We consider the system of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
necessary and sufficient optimality conditions that 
correspond to this system. We introduce Lagrange 
multiplier vector (𝜋, 𝛿) ∈ ℝ|𝐾|×ℝ|𝑃|. Any 𝑦 ∈ ℱ𝑓 is a 
global optimal solution of the Linear Program described in 
(9), if and only if 𝑦 satisfies the following system with  
𝛿 ≥ 0: 𝑐(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?𝑑
𝑝
+ Λ𝑇𝜋 − 𝛿 = 0,      𝛿𝑇𝑦 = 0. 
 
From the complementarity condition 𝛿𝑇𝑦 = 0 we find that: 
𝑦𝑝 > 0 ⇒ 𝑐𝑝(𝑓(𝑛)) + ?̃?
𝑑
𝑝
+ 𝜋𝑘 = 0, ∀𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. 
As this is the same condition as in (6), we can conclude that 
the stationary assignment is indeed the desired assignment, 
and because we chose ?̃? to be a BRUE assignment, we have 
achieved a BRUE solution. ∎ 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the stationary solution of 
the toll strategy is the desired assignment, and if we were to 
achieve this stationary solution, the strategy is usable. As 
the stationary solution is a BRUE solution, we can remove 
the tolls and the desired assignment will remain. 
 
Illustration 
In the previous section, we showed that the stationary 
solution of the toll strategy is the desired solution, 
independent of the starting point. In this section, we show, 
by numerical example, that we achieve this stationary 
solution, ?̃?𝑑, when starting from several initial (non-BRUE) 
assignments. For the simulation, we use the Braess network 
[13], as in Figure 1. Here, we consider only one OD-pair, 
with origin 1 and destination 4, and paths 𝑃1 =
{(1,2,4), (1,3,4), (1,2,3,4)}. The demand will be 𝑑1 = 6. 
We show how the toll strategy works when we start from a 
non-BRUE assignment. Note that the strategy also works if 
we start from a BRUE assignment. 
 
Figure 1: Braess Network used for Simulation 
We show the toll strategy. The assignment we approach 
using the toll strategy described in (7) is an assignment that 
could for example be the assignment with minimal 
emission, for which ?̃?𝑑 = (15, 9.5, 2.5). The corresponding 
flow pattern is 𝑓𝑑 = (1, 1.5, 3.5).  In Figure 2 we start from 
non-BRUE assignments and let the system evolve according 
to the toll strategy in (7), using the Network Tatonnement 
Process (NTP) as described by Ye and Yang to update the 
route flows [9]. The NTP is a method which (uniquely) 
describes how travelers choose to change their routes.  
Furthermore, 𝜆(𝑛) = 0.1 in each step, 𝛽 = 0.5 where 𝛽 is a 
parameter as used in the NTP. For this toll process, the value 
of 𝜀 = 15 is used. The updating of flows is stopped when 
the total penalty as in (2) does not change by more than 0.01 
in one step anymore. The process does not stop when we 
reach a BRUE, but only when we achieve the stationary, and 
therefore desired assignment. 
 
Figure 2: Toll Strategy: Path flows over time 
Figure 2 shows the path flows over time. Each shade 
represents a different starting flow, numbered 1 to 21, each 
circle represents a flow at a certain time for that starting 
flow. The location of the circle shows the flow on path 1 and 
path 3 at that time. The flow on path 2 can be determined as 
well, since the total demand is known. Figure 2 shows that 
all flows terminate close to the point 𝑓𝑑 = (1, 1.5, 3.5), 
which is the desired assignment.  
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution when the toll strategy as 
described in (7) is applied. It can be seen that, independent 
of the starting point, the desired assignment is achieved. The 
assignments reached are stationary, meaning they will not 
change over time anymore. This is due to the fact that the 
final assignments are BRUE assignments, and travelers are 
satisfied with their routes in BRUE assignments. As the 
desired assignment is a BRUE, we end up in a BRUE 
solution from each starting point. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a toll strategy for improving traffic 
assignments is proposed. We prove that when the flow does 
not evolve, the desired assignment is achieved. We show 
that in the Braess network, and thus in general, this strategy 
can achieve the desired assignment. Further research proves 
the convergence to the desired assignment.  
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